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NAVIGATING THE COURSE OF RELATION
BACK: KRUPSKI V. COSTA CROCIERE S.P.A.
AND STANDARDIZING THE
RELATION-BACK ANALYSIS
Heather Zinkiewicz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (“Rule 15” or the “Rule”)
provides for liberal amendment of pleadings.1 Rule 15(c) is the
source of the “relation back” doctrine, which allows plaintiffs to
amend a timely filed complaint to add a new defendant after the
statute of limitations has run.2 Relation back allows such an
amendment to relate back to the time of the original filing, thereby
satisfying the applicable statute of limitations.3 When a party amends
a pleading to add a new party, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) requires that the
new party “knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.”4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Krupski v.
Costa Crociere S.p.A.5 to resolve tension among the circuits over
Rule 15’s breadth and to clarify what constitutes a “mistake.”6
* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science, University of
California, San Diego, June 2008. A special thanks to Loyola Law School Professor Michael
Waterstone and the staffers and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, especially
Elena DeCoste Grieco and Jeff Payne.
1. See Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Procedure: The Name Game: When Is a Mistake a
Mistake?—Parsing Rule 15 on the Relation-Back Doctrine of Amendments to Complaints, 37
PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 326, 327 (2010).
2. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2010). “An amendment to
a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment changes the
party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P.
15(c)(1)(C).
3. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 327.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
5. 130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010).
6. Id. at 2492; see, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d
458, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2007); Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2006); Leonard
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Before Krupski, some courts narrowly interpreted “mistake” so
as to make amendment virtually impossible, while other courts
disregarded the mistake requirement almost entirely.7 Some circuits
held relation back was not allowed when an amending party knew
the existence and the correct name of the proper party to be added
before the statute of limitations expired because it constituted a
deliberate choice not to name that party and thus was not a mistake.8
The Supreme Court rejected this view in Krupski by holding that
“relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to
be added knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s
knowledge or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.”9
Krupski clarifies when courts should allow parties to use relation
back and “strengthen[s] the policy in favor of allowing liberal
amendment of pleadings in order to resolve disputes on their
merits.”10 Part II of this Comment provides the facts and procedural
posture of Krupski. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s reasoning,
including the analysis of whose knowledge is determinative and
whether an amending party’s delay in amending the complaint is
relevant. Part IV discusses the importance of the text and purpose of
Rule 15, the immediate impacts of the opinion, and the questions that
remain after Krupski. Part V concludes that Krupski standardizes the
relation-back analysis by requiring courts to focus on the knowledge
of the party to be added to the complaint.

v. Parry, 219 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000); Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1994).
7. Howard Wasserman, Watching Cases No One Else Cares About, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr.
21, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/04/watching-cases-no-oneelse-cares-about.html. Almost all federal courts agreed that relation back was proper for cases
involving misnomers, such as misspelling the defendant’s name or other typographical errors.
Mullenix, supra note 1, at 327. Some courts limited Rule 15(c) to misnomer cases, while other
courts took a more liberal view and held that both mistakes of fact and law constituted a mistake.
Id. Courts also differed regarding whether to consider the diligence of the amending party to
determine the defendant’s correct identity. Id.
8. See Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2492.
9. Id. at 2490 (emphasis added).
10. In re Dwek, Nos. 07-11757, 09-18421, 09-40969, 2010 WL 3087474, at *3 (Bankr.
D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2010).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 21, 2007, plaintiff Wanda Krupski tripped over a
cable and fractured her femur while aboard the cruise ship Costa
Magica.11 Krupski’s cruise ticket stated it was the sole contract
between each passenger and the carrier, and it included various
requirements for obtaining damages for an injury suffered on board
one of the carrier’s ships.12 The ticket defined the carrier and all other
vessels “owned, chartered, operated, marketed, or provided” by the
carrier as Italian corporation Costa Crociere S.p.A.13 The ticket
extended the defenses, limitations, and exceptions that the carrier
could invoke to all persons acting on behalf of the carrier or on
whose behalf the carrier could act. This included Costa Cruise Lines
N.V. (“Costa Cruise”), which was identified as the carrier’s sales and
marketing agent and was also the issuer of the ticket and
accompanying contract.14 The front of the ticket listed Costa Cruise’s
address in Florida and stated “that an entity called ‘Costa Cruises’”
was the first cruise line in the world to obtain a certain quality
certification.15
On July 2, 2007, Krupski’s counsel notified Costa Cruise of
Krupski’s injury, and on July 9, 2007, the Costa Cruise claims
administrator requested additional information from Krupski to assist
with pre-litigation settlement negotiations.16 However, negotiations
proved unsuccessful, and Krupski filed suit against Costa Cruise on
February 1, 2008, three weeks before the one-year limitations period
expired.17 The complaint alleged that Costa Cruise owned, operated,
managed, supervised, and controlled the ship on which Krupski had

11. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2490.
12. Id. For example, the ticket required an injured person to submit written notice of the
claim to the carrier or its authorized agent within 185 days after the date of injury, to file a lawsuit
within one year after the injury, and to serve the lawsuit within 120 days after filing. Id.
13. Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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injured herself.18 On February 4, 2008, Krupski served Costa
Cruise.19
Although Costa Cruise thrice asserted to Krupski that it was the
wrong defendant,20 Krupski argued in her response to Costa Cruise’s
motion for summary judgment that multiple sources of information
led her to believe Costa Cruise was the responsible party.21 Krupski
contended that her travel documents prominently identified Costa
Cruise, Costa Cruise’s website listed Costa Cruise in Florida as the
U.S. office for the Italian company Costa Crociere, and the Florida
Department of State website listed Costa Cruise as the only Costarelated company registered to do business in Florida.22 Furthermore,
Krupski noted that Costa Cruise’s claims administrator responded to
her claims notification without mentioning that Costa Cruise was not
a proper party to the suit.23 Along with her response to Costa Cruise’s
motion for summary judgment, Krupski moved to amend her
complaint to add Costa Crociere as a defendant.24
On July 2, 2008, the district court denied Costa Cruise’s motion
for summary judgment without prejudice and granted Krupski leave
to amend as long as she properly served Costa Crociere by
September 16, 2008.25 Krupski complied with the deadline by filing
an amended complaint on July 11, 2008, and serving Costa Crociere
on August 21, 2008.26 Pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation, the
district court dismissed Costa Cruise from the case.27

18. Id. The complaint named Costa Cruise as the defendant, even though Krupski’s ticket
identified Costa Crociere as the carrier and Costa Cruise as the sales and marketing agent for
Costa Crociere. See supra text accompanying notes 13–14.
19. Id. at 2491.
20. First, on February 25, 2008, Costa Cruise filed its answer and declared it was not the
proper defendant since it was merely the North American sales and marketing agent for Costa
Crociere, which was the actual carrier. Id. Second, on March 20, 2008, Costa Cruise listed in its
corporate disclosure statement that Costa Crociere was an “interested party” who was concerned
with the outcome of the case. Id. Third, on May 6, 2008, Costa Cruise moved for summary
judgment and argued that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Costa Crociere, represented by the same counsel who had
represented Costa Cruise, moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely
because the amended complaint did not relate back to the original
complaint under Rule 15(c).28 The district court agreed and
concluded that Krupski had not made a mistake.29 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
judgment for Costa Crociere for two reasons: (1) Krupski knew or
should have known that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant
because she retained her ticket and thus made a deliberate choice not
to name Costa Crociere as a party; and (2) Krupski’s 133-day delay
between when she filed her original complaint and when she sought
leave to amend constituted undue delay.30 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case.31
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment to Costa Crociere and remanded for further proceedings.32

28. Id.
29. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., No. 08-60152-CIV, 2008 WL 7423654, at *6 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 21, 2008), aff’d, 330 Fed. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d, 130 S. Ct.
2485 (2010). The court relied on Eleventh Circuit precedent and explained that the word
“mistake” should not be interpreted to mean “a deliberate decision not to sue a party whose
identity the plaintiff knew from the outset.” Id. at *5. The court concluded Krupski knew of the
proper defendant and did not make a mistake because Costa Cruise informed Krupski that Costa
Crociere was the proper defendant several times, and Krupski delayed for several months before
amending her complaint. Id. at *6.
30. Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2485. In affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit did not rely
on the information in Costa Cruise’s filings, but rather explained that Krupski’s passenger ticket,
which she had given to her counsel shortly after her injury, contained the relevant information
identifying Costa Crociere as the carrier. Id.
31. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2489. Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion except for its
reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes (“the Notes”). Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia did not believe that the Advisory Committee’s
intentions had any effect on the Rule’s meaning; instead, he believed the text of the rule always
controls. Id. at 2499. Justice Scalia’s view is not widely accepted. The Notes are viewed as
having a closer connection to the text than ordinary legislative history because they consist of the
words of the entire body that drafted a Federal Rule, of Civil Procedure whereas legislative
history consists of committee reports and individual legislators’ statements. Howard Wasserman,
Belated Thoughts on Relating Back, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 10, 2010, 8:00 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/06/belated-thoughts-on-relation-back.html.
32. Krupski, 387 F. App’x at 893.
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III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting Rule
15(c)(1).33 It focused on Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)’s requirement that the
defendant “knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.”34 The Court concluded that the text of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) supported neither of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasons for
denying relation back.35
A. The Prospective Defendant’s Knowledge Is Determinative
The Court explained that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly
focused on Krupski’s knowledge.36 The Court clarified that the
question was not whether Krupski knew or should have known that
Costa Crociere was the proper defendant but whether Costa Crociere
knew or should have known that it would have been named as a
defendant if not for a mistake.37 The Rule refers to what the
prospective defendant knew or should have known during the Rule
4(m) period of 120 days after the complaint was filed, not what the
plaintiff knew or should have known when the original complaint
was filed.38 The plaintiff’s knowledge is relevant only if it affects the
33. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493. Rule 15(c)(1) states:
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the
date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending
on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
35. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Rule 4(m) regulates the time limit for service. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is
not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after
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defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mistake
regarding the proper party’s identity.39
If the plaintiff knows of a party’s existence, the plaintiff can still
make a mistake regarding that party’s identity.40 A mistake is “[a]n
error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.”41
The reasonableness of the mistake is not at issue.42 Even if the
plaintiff knows the correct defendant exists, the plaintiff may
misunderstand the correct defendant’s status or role in the events
giving rise to the claim and may mistakenly choose to sue an
incorrect defendant.43 This deliberate but erroneous choice does not
bar a finding that the plaintiff has satisfied Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).44
To reach this conclusion, the Court distinguished Krupski from
its prior decision in Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.45 In Nelson, Adams
USA, Inc. (“Adams”) sought to amend its pleading to add a
corporation’s sole shareholder as a party, fearing the corporation did
not have sufficient funds to pay an award of attorney’s fees.46 The
Court noted that the mistake clause of Rule 15(c) was not at issue in
Nelson because Adams had not made a mistake; instead, Adams only
moved to amend its pleading when it learned that the corporation
was unable to pay the award.47 Distinguishing the facts in Krupski
from the facts in Nelson, the Court asserted that Nelson’s holding is
consistent with its understanding of Rule 15: if the failure to name
the prospective defendant in the original complaint were the result of
a fully informed decision instead of a mistake regarding the proper
defendant’s identity, Rule 15 would not be satisfied.48
According to the Court, Krupski’s complaint showed that she
meant to sue the company that “‘owned, operated, managed,
notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order
that service be made within a specified time.”).
39. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493–94.
40. Id. at 2494.
41. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 529 U.S. 460 (2000).
46. Id. at 462–63.
47. Id. at 467 n.1.
48. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496.
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supervised, and controlled’ the ship on which she was injured,” and
the complaint indicated, albeit incorrectly, that Costa Cruise
performed these duties.49 Thus, Costa Crociere should have known—
within the Rule 4(m) period—that Krupski had not named it as a
defendant only because Krupski misunderstood which Costa entity
controlled the ship.50 This was a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.51 Additionally, Costa Crociere could not reasonably
have thought Krupski was pursuing a winning strategy by suing a
defendant that was legally unable to provide relief.52
B. The Plaintiff’s Delay in Amending a Complaint Is Irrelevant
The Court proceeded to repudiate the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance
on Krupski’s delay in seeking to amend her complaint. Rule
15(c)(1)(C) includes the exclusive list of relation-back requirements,
and the amending party’s diligence is not included.53 Furthermore,
relation back is automatic once the Rule 15(c) requirements are
satisfied; the court has no discretion.54 In contrast, Rule 15(a) gives
the court discretion to grant a motion to amend a pleading to add a
party or a claim.55 Undue delay may be considered as part of the
court’s decision to grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a),56 but the
plaintiff’s speed in moving to amend the complaint should not affect
whether the amended complaint relates back.57
A court can examine the plaintiff’s conduct during the Rule
4(m) period, but only to the extent that conduct affected the
49. Id. at 2497 (citation omitted). Costa Crociere should have known it was the proper
defendant because it was represented by the same counsel who represented Costa Cruise, and
Costa Crociere and its counsel should have known that Costa Crociere, and not Costa Cruise,
owned and controlled the ship on which Krupski was injured. Id. at 2491, 2497 (citations
omitted).
50. Id. at 2497.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2496.
54. Id.
55. Id. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1) (“A party may amend its pleading . . . .” (emphasis
added)), with FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1) (“An amendment to a pleading relates back . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
56. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“In the absence
of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, . . . etc.—the leave sought should, as [Rule 15(a) requires], be ‘freely given.’”).
57. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496.
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prospective defendant’s understanding of whether a mistake was
made regarding the proper party’s identity.58 The plaintiff’s postfiling conduct is otherwise irrelevant.59 The Court rejected Costa
Crociere’s argument that Rule 15(c) requires the plaintiff to move to
amend the complaint or to file and serve an amended complaint
within the Rule 4(m) period.60 The Court concluded Krupski’s
conduct during the Rule 4(m) period suggested there was no reason
other than a mistake that she failed to name Costa Crociere.61
C. Other Considerations
The Court concluded its analysis by listing additional factors
that it weighed in making its decision. First, the Court noted the
similarity in Costa Cruise and Costa Crociere’s names constituted an
“interrelationship and similarity” that should have heightened Costa
Crociere’s suspicion of a mistake when Krupski named Costa Cruise
in a complaint describing Costa Crociere’s activities.62 Second, Costa
Crociere contributed to the confusion over the proper party for a
lawsuit: the ticket advertised that “Costa Cruises” had achieved a
quality certification but did not clarify whether “Costa Cruises” was
Costa Cruise Lines, Costa Crociere, or another related Costa
company.63 Finally, prior litigation had made Costa Crociere aware
that the difference between Costa Cruise and Costa Crociere
confused passengers.64
IV. ANALYSIS
Krupski followed the text and purpose of Rule 15(c) and broadly
interpreted what constitutes a “mistake” concerning the proper
party’s identity. The decision will immediately influence district
58. Id. at 2496–97.
59. Id. at 2497.
60. Id. at 2497 n.5.
61. Id. at 2498.
62. Id. “Crociera” even means “cruise” in Italian. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. Id.; see, e.g., Suppa v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., No. 07-60526-CIV, 2007 WL 4287508, at
*1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2007) (denying Costa Crociere’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint
when the original complaint named Costa Cruise as a defendant because it was “simply
inconceivable” that Costa Crociere was not on notice that it would have been named in the
original complaint if not for a mistake).
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court rulings on Rule 15(c) issues.65 Although it provides additional
instruction on how courts should construe Rule 15(c) mistakes,
uncertainty remains regarding how to determine what constitutes a
mistake, how to address Doe defendants, and how failing to comply
with a scheduling order affects relation back.
A. Following the Text and Purpose of Relation Back
The Court held that the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires
focusing on the knowledge of the party to be added, not the
amending party’s knowledge.66 There is no reference to the amending
party’s knowledge in Rule 15(c) other than that the amending party
made a mistake.67 The Rule specifically instructs that the party to be
added must know or should have known that it would have been sued
had there been no mistake.68 It is therefore logical that the Court
concluded that the proper analysis must focus on the new party’s
knowledge.
The Court noted the plaintiff’s diligence in amending a pleading
is not a Rule 15(c) requirement but left it unclear whether the
plaintiff’s tardiness should be wholly irrelevant.69 Arguably, it is
desirable for a plaintiff to amend a pleading quickly. Even if a
potential defendant knows within 120 days after the filing of the
complaint that it is a proper party, the potential defendant does not
know if it will be sued. Uncertainty is undesirable, especially if the
statute of limitations has expired. Eventually, potential defendants
should be in repose and should not have to worry about being sued.
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s delay in amending a pleading could
represent a deliberate decision not to sue a proper defendant.70
Krupski waited more than four months to act after learning Costa
Cruise was not a proper defendant.71 Perhaps Krupski’s lack of action
implied that her decision to sue Costa Cruise was not a mistake but a

65. John R. McLeod, Mandatory Relation Back: Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., BROWN
& JAMES (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.brownjames.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=277.
66. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493; see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
69. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496.
70. Brief in Opposition at 21, Krupski, 130 S. Ct. 2485 (No. 09-337).
71. Id.

Spring 2011]

KRUPSKI V. COSTA CROCIERE S.P.A.

1207

deliberate omission.72 Because one would logically expect a plaintiff
to seek leave to amend immediately upon learning that he or she sued
an incorrect defendant, it is unclear why the Court did not consider
Krupski’s reasons for delaying.
Instead of examining the reason for delay, the Court focused on
the history and purpose of relation back. The Court noted that its
Rule 15(c) analysis was consistent with relation back’s history and
purpose.73 The Rule’s history suggests it was promulgated by the
Supreme Court and approved by Congress to respond to mistakes
involving the incorrect identification of the party whose conduct was
described in the complaint.74 Additionally, the Court’s analysis is in
harmony with the purpose of relation back because it balanced the
defendant’s interests with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s
penchant for resolution of disputes on their merits.75 A prospective
defendant—at least one who knew or should have known he escaped
suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff did not
understand his identity—does not have any interest in repose, and it
would be unfair to let such a defendant escape the consequences.76
The Court’s liberal interpretation, however, may have been too
forgiving. The rejection of relation back is supported by a legal
system premised on favoring laws over sympathies.77 Arguably, if
the plaintiff does not follow procedural rules, he or she should not be
able to avoid the consequences simply because the result is severe.
Procedural rules lose effectiveness if courts refuse to apply them in
order to avoid harsh outcomes. If the law requires dismissal, “pleas
for liberality do not trump the law.”78

72. Id.
73. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494.
74. In re IndyMac Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 2d 495, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) responded to a recurring problem in suits against the federal government and
particularly relating to Social Security. See Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494–95. After the statute of
limitations ran, a person who had named an improper defendant in an otherwise timely lawsuit
challenging the denial of Social Security benefits could not amend his or her complaint because
the amended complaint would not relate back. Id. at 2495. “The Advisory Committee clearly
meant [these types of] filings to qualify as mistakes under the Rule.” Id.
75. Id. at 2494.
76. Id.
77. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 328.
78. Brief for Respondent at 8, Krupski, 130 S. Ct. 2485 (No. 09-337).
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Here, denying relation back would seem harsh, but Krupski
arguably got herself into her predicament by failing to protect her
own interests.79 In an adversarial court system, the plaintiff must
ascertain who is liable for his or her injury before the statute of
limitations ends.80 It appears that Krupski—or her attorney—read the
ticket because Krupski attempted to comply with its provisions
governing claims against the carrier.81 However, Krupski did not
follow the provision identifying Costa Crociere as the carrier against
which a claim should be brought.82 Instead, Krupski sued Costa
Cruise, which the ticket identified as the carrier’s sales and
marketing agent.83 Krupski’s counsel himself admitted that “under
the plain language of the ticket, Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., clearly
can’t be a carrier.”84 Failing to sue Costa Crociere may have been
unwise and even foolish, but the circumstances suggest that
Krupski’s “mistake” may have been a conscious and deliberate
decision.85
B. Immediate Significant Impact
Scholars already have lauded Krupski as a “welcome decision”
that “eliminated a gloss on [Rule 15] that imposed additional, nontextual burdens on the amending party and that inappropriately added
to the complexity of the rule.”86 Rule 15(c) will now be easier to
apply because relation back is compulsory once the Rule 15(c)
requirements are satisfied.87

79. Id. at 20.
80. Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff “later
discovers another possible defendant, she may not, merely by invoking Rule 15(c), avoid the
consequences of her earlier oversight.” Id.
81. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 13. Krupski gave notice of her claim within 185
days of the injury, filed suit within one year, and filed in the proper venue. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 14.
86. E.g., Allan Ides, The Scope of Relation Back Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c)(1)(C), LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, July 2010, at 5.
87. See McLeod, supra note 65.
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Krupski’s holding considerably alters the relation-back analysis
in both federal and state courts.88 For example, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits’ previous decisions—affirming denial of relation
back under the abuse-of-discretion standard because of the plaintiff’s
lack of diligence in seeking leave to amend the complaint to name
the correct party—are effectively overruled since Krupski requires
that amended complaints relate back to the earlier filing if Rule 15(c)
is fulfilled.89 In addition, Krupski may affect state civil procedure.90
Some state laws for amending pleadings include language nearly
identical to Rule 15(c), so the reasoning in Krupski should be highly
persuasive when state courts confront an issue similar to that in
Krupski.91
The decision is also important to the business community. For
one, it clarifies the plaintiff’s responsibility to identify the correct
corporate defendant.92 Krupski signifies the Court’s readiness to
impute notice to an associated, similarly named corporation.93 A
corporation will no longer be in repose when a plaintiff erroneously
files suit against one of the corporation’s subsidiaries even after the
statute of limitations period has ended.94 This likely affects how and
when corporations can assert statute-of-limitations defenses.95
C. Uncertain Implications
Although Krupski will have an immediate impact, its full
significance is unknown. Questions remain regarding the relation-

88. Erin McNeill, Supreme Court Holds That “Close Enough” Counts When Naming
Parties to Suit, MARTINDALE.COM (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.martindale.com/litigationlaw/article_Sands-Anderson-PC_1111520.htm.
89. McLeod, supra note 65.
90. McNeill, supra note 88.
91. Id.; e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6(iv) (2007) (“An amendment changing the party
against whom a claim is asserted . . . relates back to the date of the original pleading if . . . that
party knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against that party.”).
92. Andrew E. Tauber, United States: Supreme Court Decision Alert—June 7, 2010,
MONDAQ (June 15, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=102428.
93. McNeill, supra note 88.
94. Id.
95. Andrew E. Tauber, Supreme Court Docket Report—January 15, 2010, MONDAQ (Jan.
19, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=92390.
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back analysis in such areas as Doe defendants, scheduling orders,
and the exact breadth of what constitutes a mistake.
1. Uncertainty Regarding How Broadly
Mistake Will Be Interpreted
With the Court’s adoption of a broad understanding of
“mistake” as to a proper party’s identity, it is now uniformly
considered a mistake when the plaintiff misunderstands crucial facts
concerning a potential defendant’s identity.96 Courts will likely only
deny relation back if the plaintiff failed to name a defendant after
making a fully informed decision not to sue that defendant.97 The
Court suggested that if it is completely illogical for the plaintiff not
to sue a party, then the plaintiff’s failure to sue that party was a
mistake.98
It is unclear, however, how expansively courts will interpret
“mistake.”99 Krupski suggests that a mistake may now include a
situation in which the plaintiff does not know which of two distinct
persons or entities is liable.100 Regardless of the word’s scope,
plaintiffs must still follow the notice-and-prejudice element of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(i).101 Thus, if no connection exists between the proper but
unnamed party and the improperly named party, the proper party will
likely not have received the necessary notice to allow relation
back.102 However, if the parties are related or similarly named
entities, as they were in Krupski, there likely will be sufficient
notice.103 The Court’s broad interpretation of “mistake” thus
principally resulted in minimizing the importance of Rule 15’s
mistake prong and increasing the significance of the notice-andprejudice element.104
96. Wasserman, supra note 31.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Court noted that Costa Crociere “articulated no strategy that it could reasonably
have thought Krupski was pursuing in suing a defendant that was legally unable to provide
relief.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2497 (2010).
99. Wasserman, supra note 31.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The mistaken-identity problem commonly occurs when different corporate entities
run separate parts of a business. McLeod, supra note 65.
104. See Wasserman, supra note 31.

Spring 2011]

KRUPSKI V. COSTA CROCIERE S.P.A.

1211

Courts could extend Krupski’s logic to cases in which both
notice is sufficient and the plaintiff adds a new defendant in addition
to the one already named.105 Some courts, however, have already
refused to extend Krupski this far. For example, in Venezia v. 12th &
Division Properties, LLC,106 a Tennessee district court refused to use
relation back to add new defendants who allegedly controlled and
worked in concert with the initial defendants.107 The court held that
the plaintiffs were not mistaken but were just unaware of the alleged
extent of the new defendants’ involvement.108 The court explained,
“In the Sixth Circuit, lack of knowledge pertaining to an intended
defendant’s identity does not constitute a ‘mistake concerning the
party’s identity’ within the meaning of Rule 15(c).”109
2. Uncertainty Regarding Doe Defendants
The Krupski Court did not provide guidance for how to address
Doe defendants.110 The prevailing view before Krupski was that
relation back did not encompass Doe defendants because the plaintiff
did not make a mistake in suing Doe but rather sued Doe because he
or she did not know the defendant’s identity.111 This lack of
knowledge was not considered a mistake.112 After Krupski, courts
have continued to hold that lack of knowledge is not a mistake,113 but
other courts may extend the Court’s broad understanding of
“mistake” to include Doe defendants.114 Arguably, an identity
105. Id.
106. No. 3:09-cv-430, 2010 WL 3122787 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2010).
107. Id. at *4–5.
108. Id. at *5.
109. Id. at *4; see also Burdine v. Kaiser, No. 3:09CV1026, 2010 WL 2606257, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio June 25, 2010) (“The Sixth Circuit . . . does not consider adding new parties as correcting
mistaken identity under Rule 15(c). Even ‘[s]ubstituting a named defendant for a “John Doe”
defendant is considered a change in parties’ and thus would not relate back.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)). The Second and Fifth Circuits follow the same rule as the Sixth
Circuit—that a lack of knowledge is not a mistake—and district courts in both the Second and
Fifth Circuits have also upheld this rule post-Krupski. Dominguez v. City of New York, No. 10
Civ. 2620(BMC), 2010 WL 3419677, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); Trigo v. TDCJ-CID
Officials, No. H-05-2012, 2010 WL 3359481, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2010).
110. Wasserman, supra note 31.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 106–09.
114. Wasserman, supra note 31.
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mistake may occur when the plaintiff sues a Doe defendant because
the plaintiff has insufficient knowledge of the defendant’s true
identity.115 As the Indiana district court in Smetzer v. Newton116 noted,
the governance of Doe defendants “may have changed” as a result of
Krupski.117 However, the Smetzer court did not apply Krupski
because neither party discussed Krupski or its impact.118 Even with
an identity mistake, the notice-and-prejudice element still applies to
Doe defendants.119
3. Uncertainty Regarding Scheduling Orders
Krupski also does not provide guidance on how failing to
comply with a scheduling order affects relation back.120 A scheduling
order was not at issue in Krupski because Krupski moved for leave to
amend within the timeframe allowed by the district court’s
scheduling order.121 If the plaintiff seeks leave to amend after the
scheduling order’s allotted time, a defendant will have a stronger
argument that the amended complaint should not relate back.122 In
addition to timeliness, a judge should look at other factors, such as
how long after the deadline the plaintiff moved to amend and
whether the amended complaint will affect the trial date.123
V. CONCLUSION
After Krupski, district courts must focus on the knowledge of
the party to be added instead of the amending party’s knowledge
when applying Rule 15(c). Furthermore, district judges now lack
discretion to deny relation back if Rule 15(c) is satisfied, especially if
the plaintiff complies with a scheduling order.124 The Court’s analysis
115. Id.
116. No. 1:10-CV-93-JVB, 2010 WL 3219135 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 13, 2010).
117. Id. at *10.
118. Id.
119. See Nazerzadeh v. Harris Cnty., No. H-08-0499, 2010 WL 3817149, at *36 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 27, 2010) (dismissing claims against John Does one through ten because the Doe defendants
did not receive timely notice of the lawsuit).
120. McLeod, supra note 65.
121. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2498 n.6 (2010).
122. McLeod, supra note 65.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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closely followed Rule 15, although arguably the plaintiff’s speed in
moving to amend a complaint should have been relevant to the
Court’s analysis, even though the Rule does not mention delay. The
Court broadly interpreted what constitutes a mistake, but it is unclear
how extensively courts will construe “mistake” going forward. It is
possible that the Court’s liberal interpretation was too lenient
because Krupski complied with some of the provisions listed in the
ticket but not others, such as the provision that named Costa Crociere
as the correct party to sue. Krupski will likely not be the Court’s final
decision on relation back because questions remain, most notably
regarding Doe defendants and scheduling orders.
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